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Abstract
We describe some preliminary experiments realized with the Financial \Toy-Room" (a micro-
founded simulation environment for decentralized trade in a homogeneous nancial asset). The
experiments are aimed at testing the system, and exploring its exibility in depicting specic
contexts as sub-cases. For this purpose, we selected an issue that has been widely investigated in
the literature: the existence and characterization of markets in which prices are (or are believed
to be) \quality signals" passing information from informed to uninformed traders. In our out-
of-equilibrium simulation analysis, we take agents to trade based on a spread rule, and introduce
dis-synchronization in agents' updating processes. Thus, we investigate how dis-synchronization,
updating paces and spreads aect persistence of trade and the time-path of prices in extreme
regimes (i.e. when all agents are informed, or all agents are uninformed).
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Some Preliminary Experiments with the Financial
\Toy-Room"
Francesca Chiaromonte (chiaro@iiasa.ac.at)
Mariele Berte (mberte@sda.uni-bocconi.it)
Introduction
In this paper, we describe some preliminary experiments realized with the Financial \Toy-
Room" (FTR). FTR is a micro-founded simulation environment for decentralized trade in a
homogeneous nancial asset. We shall not provide a detailed description of the overall model,
nor of the code that implements it; the reader is supposed to consider this as the third part of
a trilogy whose rst part is F. Chiaromonte, G. Dosi (1998), which provides a full account of
the model, and whose second part is M. Berte (1998), which contains all technical details of the
code
1
.
The aim of these preliminary experiments is to test-run FTR, and explore its exibility in
depicting specic contexts as sub-cases. In order to do so, we selected an issue that has been
widely investigated in the literature: the existence and characterization of markets in which
prices are (or are believed to be) quality signals passing information from informed to uninformed
traders.
In Section 1 we give a short sketch of the equilibrium analyses relevant to our experiments. In
Sections 2 and 3, we dene the setting as a specication of FTR, and identify experimental
quantities and mechanisms that are crucial for interpreting simulation outputs. In Section 4 we
present our experiments. Section 5 contains some nal remarks.
1 Near-perfectly informative markets
Suppose acquiring information on the quality of an asset is costly. Under what conditions can
markets in which prices embody quality signals, and hence pass information from informed to
uninformed agents, exist as the equilibrium outcome of decentralized optimizations by a group
of homogeneous price takers? A large literature has been devoted to this issue. In particular, we
will refer to S.J. Grossman, J.E. Stiglitz (1976, 1980). What follows is a loose and incomplete
rephrasing of the basic lines of thought of these equilibrium analyses, aimed at capturing the
points that will be relevant to our experiments.
Consider an homogeneous asset providing a unitary return Z, and agents that are homogeneous
1
The code was developed using the LSD platform (M. Valente, 1997).
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in terms of preference structure; that is, that weight portfolios of asset and cash
2
through the
same utility function. Z is unknown to the agents, but they form expectations, say
^
Z, about it.
E((
^
Z Z)
2
) represents the prediction risk. Homogeneity of agents implies, among other things,
equal attitudes towards prediction risk.
Assume agents to be aware of the fact that it is impossible to realize gains through the trading
process in itself
3
, so that they will exchange asset against cash only as long as they maintain
dierent expectations
4
.
Assume that the exchange price p is public information, and a noisy version of the return Z + e,
e  N(0; 
2
), is available to any agent who is willing to acquire it at a xed positive cost c > 0.
Agents form their expectations
^
Z either observing Z + e, or simply observing the price.
Furthermore, assume agents to be aware of the fact that neither the exchange price, nor the
share of the population that sustains the cost and observes Z + e, are aected by what they
themselves do (i.e. both asset exchanges and information acquisitions occur in a perfectly
competitive regime).
Finally, assume that a second source of randomness X , independent of the noise e, enters the
price formation mechanism.
Loosely speaking, a near-perfectly informative market is one in which when an  2 (0; 1] share of
the population observes Z+ e, the clearing price p(; Z+ e;X) corresponding to agents optimal
trading decisions behaves like Z + ~e(; e;X), where the second addend is still a 0-mean normal
with
var(~e(; e;X)) = v(; 
2
; var(X))
which decreases in , increases in 
2
and var(X), and coincides with 
2
if either 
2
itself or
var(X) are equal to 0. For  = 0, the clearing price is not related to the return anymore: p
0
(X).
In this simplied picture, a near-perfectly informative market is one in which p(; Z+e;X) and
Z + e both convey unbiased information about Z, and only dier in terms of variance (that is,
of prediction risk). The two cases 
2
= 0 or var(X) = 0 {corresponding to Z + e having innite
precision, or absence of the second source of randomness{ are the ones in which the clearing
price is exactly equivalent to Z + e in predicting Z.
For given levels of 
2
and var(X), the worth of

2
v(; 
2
; var(X))
under the agents (common) utility decreases in . On top of the exchange equilibrium, an equilib-
rium share corresponding to agents optimal information choices is given by an a(c; 
2
; var(X)) 2
(0; 1) which makes the worth coincide with the cost c, or by 0 (1) if the worth is smaller (larger)
than c even at  = 0 (1). When it exists, the equilibrium share decreases in c, and increases in

2
and var(X).
Again loosely speaking, such an equilibrium exists provided prices are not as good as the costly
Z + e; that is, provided both 
2
and var(X) are strictly positive
5
.
2
The \alternative" asset with known and xed return.
3
As for example intermediary gains, or inter-temporal gains, based on buying and selling at dierent prices.
4
In other words, if the
^
Z's of all agents are all equal, there is no price p at which an agent nds it convenient
to buy (
^
Z > p) and another convenient to sell (
^
Z < p) due to return expectations, and we assume agents see no
further reason to engage in transactions.
5
More rigorously, if 
2
= 0, no point in [0,1] {including 0 that is approached as 
2
approaches 0{ is an
{ 3{
For given levels 
2
; var(X) > 0, one can calculate a nite upper value of the cost, above which
the equilibrium share is 0, and a positive lower value, under which the equilibrium share is 1. On
the other hand, these equilibria, as well as ones very close to 0 and 1, are thin trade equilibria:
since all (or almost all) agents' return expectations coincide, there will be no trade, or very little
trade. In particular, this will be the case if, regardless of the cost, a(c; 
2
; var(X)) approaches 0
because 
2
or var(X) approach 0
6
.
Moreover, thin-trade equilibria characterized by higher overall information on the underlying
return (lower uncertainty in prediction) {close or coincident with 1{ are also characterized by a
higher uncertainty in price (volatility), and therefore in capital value
7
.
1.1 Some remarks
In the equilibrium analysis we have just described, agents' desires to trade are always satised:
the exchange price is a clearing price; that is, a price that renders demand and supply equal to one
another, and makes further sales or acquisitions equivalent to any of the homogeneous traders.
Moreover, agents' desires relative to information are always satised: the equilibrium share is
one that makes being informed or uninformed perfectly equivalent to any of the homogeneous
traders. Finally, satisfaction is due to the fact that agents' models of the world are always
correct: some traits relative to market functioning are postulated, and agents are taken to be
all (equally) aware of them. Usually, the underlying rationale is that such traits have been
historically stable enough to allow all agents to learn about them.
In particular, both informed agents and agents that use the price have rational (i.e. unbiased)
expectations on the return, and in choosing whether to get informed agents know v(; 
2
; var(X)),
and the values of 
2
and var(X).
In one phrase, equilibrium analysis eliminates ex-post/ex-ante distinctions and thereby the role
of time.
With our simulation experiments, we will perform an out-of-equilibrium analysis; that is, one in
which time is truly oriented and irreversible, and ex-post/ex-ante distinctions are reintroduced.
2 Dening the setting as a special room
Let us put a population of agents T 2 T , exchanging the homogeneous asset against cash, into
a trading room. The asset return is determined \outside" the room, and unknown to all agents.
equilibrium, while if 
2
> 0 but var(X) = 0, the only candidate point is 0, and it is an equilibrium only if c is
suciently high.
6
More rigorously, if V (a(c; 
2
; var(X));Z + e;X) stands for the volume of trade at equilibrium, and c makes
the equilibrium share 0 or 1
E(V (0; Z + e;X)) = var(V (0; Z + e;X)) = 0
Moreover, if 0 is approached because 
2
or var(X) approach 0
lim E(V (a(c; 
2
; var(X));Z + e;X)) = lim var(V (a(c; 
2
;var(X))Z + e;X)) = 0
7
var(p(a(c; 
2
; var(X));Z + e;X)) is larger when a(c; 
2
; var(X)) approaches 1 than when it approaches 0.
This might be taken to be undesirable to agents. The reason why this trading-related eect does not aect the
decentralized optimization is that agents know the share does not depend on what they themselves do individually.
{ 4{
2.1 Time representation, dis-synchronization and pace of updatings
\Time"
8
in FTR is constructed translating transaction events into minutes by means of a
converting sequence 
j
; j = 1; 2; : : :
9
. Dierent 
j
's serve the purpose of representing accelera-
tions/decelerations of trade on the minute time-scale. In these experiments, we set 
j
= ; j =
1; 2; : : : (so  represents the xed length in transactions of any minute). Once the converting
sequence has been specied in this way, \thinning of trade" corresponds to \lingering of time",
and the market breaks down when (event-based) time in it stops running.
FTR also allows \times" underlying agents' updating processes to have dierent paces, and
be dis-synchronous (among themselves and with respect to overall time), by means of agent-
specic converting sequences
10
. Dis-synchronization and diversied updating paces
might be extremely relevant for persistence of trade. We generate dis-synchronization via a
chance element, and allow for parametric diversication, by taking

j
[T ]; j = 1; 2; : : : iid Poiss([T ]) ; independent across T
2.2 Trade decisions, expectations and spreads
When agents update, they revise the value of a number of decision variables
11
.
We assume all agents to limit themselves to transactions that are spot on both sides. Whenever
agents update, they set
D

b
[T ] = D

b
[T ] = D

b
[T ] = D

b
[T ] = f(0; 0)g
where the D
()
()
[T ]'s represent sets of allowed posticipations of the actual ows of cash and asset,
with respect to the moment in which a transaction is concluded.
We assume all agents to be always available to trade spot within the limits of their cash and asset
endowments, both as seekers and as acceptors. On the other hand, we assume them to believe
it is impossible to realize gains through the trading process in itself, so that they will conclude
transactions only as long as they maintain dierent expectations on the unknown \out-of-the-
room" return, and trade will be sustained solely by heterogeneity is such expectations.
Moreover, we assume agents to form an interval expectation on the return, using a point-
expectation
^
Z[T ] as if it were \rational"
12
, and a guess of its standard deviation s
^
Z
[T ]
13
. Thus,
agents trade with a spread rule based on their interval expectation. Whenever updating, they
8
Notice that throughout our description we omit time indexing for all quantities involved in the model, except
when referring to their initialization. Only some quantities are indexed by the transaction they are associated
with (N), or the minute they refer to (H). The way time is represented and handled in FTR makes this the most
obvious and easiest choice. In fact, we deal with 3 distinct \gears" in stepping forward a simulation: trading
rounds, transaction (the outcomes of some, but not necessarily all, rounds), and minutes (dened by the stream
of transactions via converting sequences).
9
Minute 1 lasts until the 
1
th transaction is concluded, minute 2 until the (
1
+
2
)th transaction is concluded,
etc.
10
Agent T always updates his decision variables after concluding a transaction. Moreover, whether he concludes
transactions or not, he updates at the beginning of each minute on his watch. The watch is itself brought forward
by (overall) transactions, but the sequence is agent-specic: minute 1 lasts until transaction 
1
[T ], minute 2 until
transaction (
1
[T ] + 
2
[T ]), etc.
11
The ones contained in their \trading documents", i.e. the acceptor and seeker sheets.
12
i.e. as if it were an unbiased estimate of the unknown return.
13
i.e. an estimate of the standard deviation of the (supposedly) unbiased estimate above.
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set
14
f

b
[T ] = f

b
[T ] = 1 ; p

b
[T ] = p

b
[T ] = minf
^
Z[T ]  s
^
Z
[T ]; m[T ]g
f

s
[T ] = f

s
[T ] = Ind(q[T ]  1) ; p

b
[T ] = p

b
[T ] =
^
Z [T ] + s
^
Z
[T ]
where m[T ] 2 IR
1
+
and q[T ] 2 IN
1
represent cash and asset endowments, the f
()
()
[T ]'s are 0; 1
ags indicating availability to buy/sell as acceptor/seeker, and reference prices are cutting points
2 IR
1
+
: buying as acceptor/seeker is feasible at any price < p
()
b
[T ], and selling as acceptor/seeker
is feasible at any price > p
()
s
[T ].  counts standard deviations from the center
15
.
Decision variables do not include quantities, because for the time being all transactions in FTR
are supposed to concern a single unit of asset
16
.
2.3 Fundamentalists and noise traders
We take the current exchange price p
(N)
(the price of transaction N) to be public information,
and assume the existence of a second (non-public) information source which, on call, provides a
noisy version of the return Z
(H)
+ e[T ], e[T ]  N(0; 
2
)
17
. H indicates the current minute.
We divide agents in two homogeneous groups T
Fu
and T
No
, according to their behavioral state
indicator r[T ] = 1; 2
18
. A behavioral state entails a given updating pace, a given rule to form
the point-expectation, and a given guess of its standard deviation.
A T 2 T
Fu
(r[T ] = 1) is an informed trader (fundamentalist); that is, an agent with access
to the non-public information source. (The inverse of) his pace of updating is [T ] = 
Fu
.
When updating, he forms his center as
^
Z[T ] = Z
(H)
+ e
 
[T ] (1)
Hence, a fundamentalist indeed uses a rational point-expectation.  2 f0; 1g allows us to further
distinguish a case in which the errors all coincide with one draw, and a case in which they are
separate and independent draws, from a N(0; 
2
) distribution
 = 0 : e
0
[T ] = e
(H)
 N(0; 
2
) ; 8T 2 T
Fu
updating in H
 = 1 : e
1
[T ] iid N(0; 
2
) ; across T 2 T
Fu
updating in H
A fundamentalist's spread is based on his guess s
^
Z
[T ] = s
Fu
of .
A T 2 T
No
(r[T ] = 2) is an uninformed or noise trader; that is, an agent without access to
the non-public information source. (The inverse of) his average pace of updating is [T ] = 
No
.
When updating, he forms his center as
^
Z [T ] = p
(N)
(2)
14
In the behavioral taxonomy implementation described in M. Berte (1998), this corresponds to type[T ] = 2.
15
An agent is highly condent that the return value falls somewhere in [
^
Z[T ]   s
^
Z
[T ];
^
Z[T ] + s
^
Z
[T ]], and is
therefore ready to buy at prices on the left of it, and ready to sell at prices on the right.
16
This, together with the fact that each minute is bound to contain exactly  transactions, means we are
imposing a xed trading volume per minute.
17
Normality is the most obvious distributional assumption for noises. On the other hand, changing error
distribution would be very easy in FTR; simulation studies are not limited by constraints due to analytical
tractability.
18
In the behavioral taxonomy implementation described in M. Berte (1998) these are actually state 1, and 3
with a particular twist on parameters.
{ 6{
Hence, a noise trader uses the price as if it were a rational point-expectation; that is, as if
p
(N)
 Z
(H)
+ ~e ; ~e  N(0; ~
2
)
This belief on how trade inside the room captures the return through prices, might be right, but
also wrong. A noise trader's spread is based on his guess s
^
Z
[T ] = s
No
of ~.
In terms of the behavioral taxonomy in F. Chiaromonte, G. Dosi (1998), informed traders are
Strong Fundamentalists setting x
o
= x = Z
(H)
+ e[T ], and forming a spread with [T ] = 1 and
"[T ] = s
Fu
. Uninformed traders are Noise Traders setting x
o
= x = p
(N)
, and forming a spread
with [T ] = 1 and "[T ] = s
No
.
Why do agents belong to one or the other category? One can provide explanations of dierent
natures: Maybe fundamentalists can access information at no cost, and noise traders simply can
not. Or maybe fundamentalists are willing to pay for the information, and noise traders are
not because they are reasonably condent in the informativeness of prices, and have a dierent
attitude towards uncertainty on the return. More generally, any combination of dierences in
capabilities and in attitudes could be playing in determining the two groups.
With this heterogeneity-based rationale, we perform the division at the outset, and control the
share of fundamentalists
 =
no(T
Fu
)
no(T
Fu
) + no(T
No
)
as an experimental parameter.
It is important to stress that, unlike equilibrium analysis, we don't need to assume that agents'
beliefs or guesses are correct ex-ante. What we will assume is that they are not revised on the
time scale of the simulation experiments (agents do not change group, do not evolve dierent
rules to form their point-expectations, and keep their standard deviation guesses).
Notice that whether s
Fu
is close to , and whether s
No
is larger than  or s
Fu
and by how much
19
, is controlled when xing the values of such experimental parameters. Whether prices are
indeed rational expectations, and with a variability close to the noise traders' guess s
No
, on the
other hand, is an experimental outcome whose ex-post soundness can be veried under dierent
parameters settings.
2.4 The physics of trading
In a generic trading round, an agent is drawn at random to be the seeker. He will have access
to k 2 IN
1
acceptors drawn at random among the remaining agents
20
. Matching his ags
and reference prices with the ones of these acceptors, the seeker determines a set of feasible
transactions. If the set is empty, the round ends inconclusively. Indicating with T the seeker,
and neglecting temporarily the eect of endowments constraints, this occurs if and only if
(
^
Z[T ]  s
^
Z
[T ];
^
Z[T ] + s
^
Z
[T ]) \ (
^
Z[T
0
]  s
^
Z
[T
0
];
^
Z[T
0
] + s
^
Z
[T
0
]) 6= ; (3)
19
That is, whether noise traders treat prices as rational expectations on the return, but attribute them a
standard deviation larger than the one associated with the non-public information source (or larger than the
fundamentalists' guess on it), and maybe whether they make such dierence depend on  (or on a guess of it).
20
Notice that, under whatever endowment constraint, all agents will always have at least f

b
[T ] = f

b
[T ] = 1,
and hence be ready to enter the round as both seekers and acceptors (the cash constraint aecting their buying
reference prices).
{ 7{
for all accessible acceptors T
0
. If the set of feasible transactions is not empty (i.e. if the
intersection above is empty for at least one T
0
), the seeker selects among feasible transactions
the one that is most convenient in terms of price. The transaction is then concluded
21
at a
price given by a convex combination of the two reference prices, with weight  2 [0; 1] for the
seeker, and (1 ) for the acceptor. Again neglecting endowment constraints, and assuming for
instance the most convenient transaction to involve the seeker as a buyer
p
(N)
= (
^
Z[T ]  s
^
Z
[T ]) + (1  )(
^
Z[T
0
] + s
^
Z
[T
0
]) (4)
2.5 Some remarks on possibilities
We restrict to spot trading, but studying persistence when agents engage in \short" or \forward"
trading (see F. Chiaromonte, G. Dosi 1998) could be quite interesting, and certainly constitutes
an avenue for further simulation experiments.
Moreover, we do not introduce a birth process, and maintain the underlying return constant
throughout: Z
(H)
= Z, H = 1; 2; : : : with no intrinsic random uctuation
22
. Clearly, a properly
specied birth process would provide means for exogenously sustaining heterogeneity in return
expectations, and thereby trade
23
. So would a properly specied time-path for the return.
These, too, are avenues for further simulation experiments.
FTR permits to introduce non-spot trading and births, and obviously to specify a non-trivial
dynamics for Z
(H)
. We decided to leave these elements out not because of technical diculties,
but rather to limit the set of experimental determinants in these preliminary simulations. In
a sense, since our fundamental aim was to test the system, we wanted to maintain the special
room simple enough as to be able to \run simulations in our heads".
3 Frame quantities, the experimental space, and some reading
keys
With our rst round of experiments, we perform an out-of-equilibrium investigation of how, given
the price formation mechanism implicit in the special room we just described, persistence of
trade and the time-path of prices are aected by
 dis-synchronization and pace of agents updating processes
 the fact that agents use a spread rule, with a spread parameter based on their standard
deviation guess, and
 single versus iid error draws for fundamentalists' updatings
in the two extreme regimes; that is when all agents are noise traders, or all agents are funda-
mentalists ( = 0 or 1). Regarding the path of prices, we focus in particular on its relation to
the underlying return value, and volatility.
21
And immediately completed with delivery and payment, since trading is spot on both sides.
22
In terms of the description in F. Chiaromonte, G. Dosi (1998), we take z
(H)
= Z (constant) and var(
(H)
) = 0,
but we allow for \reading errors".
23
The premise for this is obviously that newcomers' expectations are not cloned from expectations of incumbents
{possibly in the process of converging, but generated as to maintain heterogeneity.
{ 8{
We label frame quantities those parameters and variables initializations that need to be pro-
vided as input for each simulation experiment, but are not immediately relevant for the analysis
to be performed. Their values are kept constant across experiments
24
:
Frame Quantities
no(T ) (overall) no. of agents 50
 length (in trans.'s) of each minute 10
 no. of st. dev.'s for spreads 1
Z
0
= Z (const.) value of the return 200
 st. dev. of e[T ]'s 25
k no. of accessible acceptors no(T )=2 = 25
 seeker's power in pricing 0
^
Z
0
[T ] initialization of centers no(T )=2 = 25 at each 100 + =  50
m
0
[T ]; T 2 T initialization of cash endowments m
0
[T ] = 10Z = 2000; 8T 2 T
q
0
[T ]; T 2 T initialization of asset endowments q
0
[T ] = 10; 8T 2 T
On a technical note, we dene trade to have vanished after (no(T )=(k+1))  inconclusive trading
rounds. The choice is obviously arbitrary, but the idea is to keep trying long enough as to be
reasonably condent that the lack of conclusion is not merely due to chance in drawing seeker
and acceptors
25
.  represents an additional frame quantity, that we x at  = k+1 = 26. Thus,
we will declare trade to have vanished after no(T ) = 50 attempts.
Finally, if trade does not vanish before, a simulation experiment runs until 500 transactions are
concluded, i.e. for 50 minutes.
24
This doesn't necessarily mean that those quantities do no aect the phenomena under consideration, but rather
that (if they do) it isn't their eect we intend to investigate. Maintaining their values xed across experiments
means we are performing a conditional investigation on experimental quantities. Rigorously speaking, this would
be satisfactory only under the assumption that frame and experimental quantities have independent eects on
the phenomena. More loosely, it would still be acceptable if frame quantities were xed at \neutral levels" (i.e.
levels conditioning on which one reproduces the marginal eect of experimental quantities), or at levels which are
taken to be the ones of real interest (e.g. because they are derived from empirical evidence).
25
Given the structure of a trading round, the probability of a generic trader T being involved (as seeker or
acceptor) is easily shown to be
1
no(T )
+

1 
1
no(T )


no(T ) 1
k

 
no(T ) 2
k   1
!
=
k + 1
no(T )
Trading rounds are independent. What is the probability that 9 an agent which is not involved in R successive
rounds? This is the probability that agent 1 is not involved, or agent 2 is not involved, etc. As such, it is bound
from above by the sum of the probabilities that each single agent is not involved, which are all equal. The generic
one is given by the product of the probabilities of an agent not being involved in each single round. Those are all
equal as well. In summary
P (9T not involved in R successive rounds)  no(T )

1 
k + 1
no(T )

R
The expression we consider is
no(T )

1 
k + 1
no(T )

no(T )
k+1

When no(T ) is fairly large, k = no(T )=2 and  = k+1 (so that the exponent is no(T )), the above is approximately
no(T )=2
no(T )
, which is indeed extremely small. Hence, with no(T ) attempts the probability that there is an agent
which is never involved is negligible. As a consequence, so is the probability that the lack of trade is merely due
to chance in drawing seeker and acceptors.
{ 9{
The experimental space is given by the cross product of the experimental quantities ranges:
Experimental Quantities
 share of fundamentalists in the room 2 [0; 1]

Fu
(inverse of) av. pace of updating for fundamentalists 2 IN
1

No
(inverse of) av. pace of updating for noise traders 2 IN
1
 single vs iid error draws for fundamentalists 2 f0; 1g
s
Fu
guess of error st. dev. by fundamentalists 2 IR
1
+
s
No
guess of st. dev. by noise traders 2 IR
1
+
Obviously whether s
No
> s
Fu
is relevant only for simulation experiments in which both parame-
ters are involved (which will not be the case in our rst round). Given our centers initialization,
we will also require s
Fu
; s
No
 50; this guarantees that an agent whose initial center is 50 still
starts with a non-negative buying reference price
26
.
Before passing to the description of our experiments, let us list some general reading keys that
we will use in interpreting outcomes.
 K1: 
()
is both the mean and the variance of a Poisson. Consequently, 
Fu
is the (inverse
of) the average pace of updatings for fundamentalists, but also a measure of the average
degree of dis-synchronization among them
27
. The same holds for noise traders.
 K2: Fast updating paces (small 
()
), ceteris paribus, increase the mobility of centers in
the directions dictated by their updating functions given in Equation 1 and Equation 2.
 K3: As can be seen through Equation 3, large spreads (s
()
) have the eect of reducing
the overall number of feasible transactions (a transaction is feasible only between agents
whose centers have a distance larger than the sum of their spreads). Thus, ceteris paribus,
large spreads tend to thin trade.
 K4: On the other hand, as can be seen through Equation 4, large spreads allow for wide
gaps between centers and the prices of concluded transactions (since we xed  = 0, the
price will be one spread away from the center of the acceptor).
 K5: Fast updating paces can always be seen as corresponding to good ex-ante stands on
the side of the agents.
 K6: A guess s
Fu
close to  can be seen as a good ex-ante stand on the side of funda-
mentalists. This concept can be loosely paralleled for noise traders: First, noise traders
can't be sure that prices are indeed rational point-expectations. Second, even if they are
reasonably condent in unbiasedness, they might take the standard deviation to depend
inversely on . Thus, especially if  is small, a high s
No
can be seen as a good ex-ante
stand on the side of noise traders.
26
As a mater of fact, we take both guesses to be smaller than  = 25.
27
In the sense that a large 
Fu
makes the 
j
[T ]'s of a single fundamentalist T , as well as the 
j
[T ]'s and 
j
[T
0
]'s
of two distinct fundamentalists T , T
0
, more dierent on average.
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4 A rst round of simulation experiments
4.1 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we assume that all agents in the room are noise traders, i.e. that  = 0. If all
agents updated at all times, the system would die immediately: All point-expectations on the
return would be set to p
(1)
right after the rst transaction is concluded, eliminating the initial
heterogeneity. Centers would all coincide, and no further trading would be possible
28
. The
simulation would still run the canonical number of attempts, and then terminate.
Can dis-synchronization of the updating processes counteract convergence and make trade per-
sist, at least temporarily? And how would prices behave in the meanwhile?
We wanted to explore how duration of trade (measured by H
quit
; the minute in which time
stops), and the path of prices, depend on the (common) updating pace and spread of the noise
traders. Thus, we performed simulations on a grid of values for 
No
and s
No
29
. Results can be
summarized as follows:
Persistence:
Duration of Trade: H
quit
s
No
= 5 s
No
= 10 s
No
= 15

No
= 2 5 3 2

No
= 10 11 6 4

No
= 20 18 9 7

No
= 30 21 10 7
Trade duration is directly linked to 
No
, and inversely linked to s
No
. The system never reaches
the 50 minutes limit, and achieves non-negligible duration only for large enough 
No
and small
enough s
No
.
Here return expectations are based on prices, and hence there is a circular mechanism (centers
determine prices, that in turn determine centers, etc)
30
. As a consequence, both K2 and K4
translate into the centers moving faster towards each other, the smaller 
No
and the larger s
No
.
Moreover, the inverse eect of s
No
on duration is strengthened by K3. Recall that fast updating
paces and large spreads ought to characterize agents with better ex-ante stands (K5 and K6).
The path of prices:
In all cases, along the temporary persistence phase prices spiral towards the middle of the initial
centers range (which is not related to the underlying Z), with a progressively smaller volatility
(i.e. within minute variability). Fig. 1 shows the path of prices for the longest simulation
(
No
= 30, s
No
= 5).
4.2 Experiment 2A
In Experiment 2A, we assume that all agents in the room are fundamentalists, i.e. that  = 1.
We further assume that agents updating in a given minute observe Z plus a single error draw
28
Incidentally, since the spreads are all the same (all agents belong to the same group) this makes coincidence
of centers equivalent to that of the whole intervals.
29

Fu
;  , and s
Fu
are irrelevant, as they are not used by the simulations relative to Experiment 1.
30
Which gives the convergence process a self-reinforcing nature.
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Noise Traders (α=1) µ=30, s=5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241 261 281 301 321 341 361 381 401 421 441 461 481
trans. price av. price within minutes (+1) st.dev. (-1) st.dev. Z st.dev.
N=209
Figure 1: An instance of the path of prices for Experiment 1
( = 0), with  = 25. If all agents updated at all times, the system would die immediately:
All point-expectations on the return would be set to Z + e
(1)
right after the rst transaction is
concluded, eliminating the initial heterogeneity. Centers would coincide and no further trading
would be possible.
Repeating the questions in Experiment 1 and exploring the same grid of values, this time for

Fu
and s
Fu
31
, we obtained the following results
32
:
Persistence:
Duration of Trade: H
quit
s
Fu
= 5 s
Fu
= 10 s
Fu
= 15

Fu
= 2 max 11 2

Fu
= 10 max max 14

Fu
= 20 max max 25

Fu
= 30 max max max
The system reaches the 50 minutes limit in most cases. It still terminates for small enough 
Fu
and large enough s
Fu
, although trade duration is larger than that of the corresponding cases in
Experiment 1, except for 
Fu
= 2, s
Fu
= 15 (i.e. the best ex-ante stand).
Since return expectations are not based on prices, K2 and K4 do not induce self-reinforcement in
centers convergence. Although all agents updating in a given minute observe the same Z+e
(H)
,
persistence is achieved unless their ex-ante stands are \too good", and in particular, unless s
Fu
31

No
and s
No
are irrelevant, as they are not used by the simulations relative to Experiment 2A.
32
\max" means the simulation reached the 50 minutes limit.
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Fundamentalists (α=1) single draw (ψ=0) µ=30, s=5 (σ=25)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241 261 281 301 321 341 361 381 401 421 441 461 481
trans. price av. price within minutes (+1) st.dev
(-1) st.dev Z Ζ+σ
Ζ−σ st.dev.
N=33 N=50
on average 31.307
(after N=50)
Figure 2: An instance of the path of prices for Experiment 2A
is as large as to paralyze trade because of K3.
The path of prices:
In the rst phase of each simulation, prices undergo a traverse, moving from values around the
middle of the initial centers range towards values around the underlying Z. During this phase
volatility (i.e. within minutes variability) decreases. After the traverse is concluded, prices
remain around Z with a fairly constant volatility. As an instance, Fig. 2 shows the path of
prices for 
Fu
= 30, s
Fu
= 5 (it can be compared with Fig. 1 for Experiment 1).
One might then ask how duration of the traverse, and volatility thereafter, depend on 
Fu
and
s
Fu
. As a rst approximation, we considered the traverse to be concluded
33
somewhere in
between (a) the rst transaction at which (the running calculation of) the average price within
minutes crosses Z  from below, and (b) the rst transaction at which (the running calculation
of) the average price within minutes has a maximum, after (a). We then indicated with H
trav
the minute in which this mid-point falls. As a measurement of the (constant) volatility after
the traverse, we took the average of (the running calculation of) the price standard deviation
within minutes, from the peak in (b) to the end of the simulation
34
.
33
An accurate denition is not trivial, as what one needs to identify is when exactly the path of prices enters
a regime of equally sized uctuations about the underlying Z.
34
The cell for 
Fu
= 2, s
Fu
= 15 is left empty because the simulation was too short to meaningfully distinguish
a traverse and an after-traverse in it.
{ 13 {
Duration of Traverse: H
trav
Volatility after the Traverse
s
Fu
= 5 s
Fu
= 10 s
Fu
= 15 s
Fu
= 5 s
Fu
= 10 s
Fu
= 15

Fu
= 2 2 2 
Fu
= 2 24:834 24:442

Fu
= 10 3 3 3 
Fu
= 10 32:039 27:995 19:662

Fu
= 20 4 4 3 
Fu
= 20 31:253 25:624 19:667

Fu
= 30 4 4 4 
Fu
= 30 31:307 25:710 24:911
Traverse duration increases as 
Fu
increases. The link between traverse duration and pace of
updating resembles that between trade duration and pace of updating in Experiment 1. On the
other hand, s
Fu
has no signicant eect on traverse duration.
Volatility after the traverse decreases as s
Fu
increases. This is due to K4: while centers remain
apart enough for trade to persists, and as long as the eect of K3 does not enter the picture, a
larger s
Fu
allows prices to be closer to each other.
The link between 
Fu
and volatility is ambiguous, and can be interpreted through K1. On
one side, one has an inverse eect due to pace of updating: a larger 
Fu
(smaller pace of
updating) reduces the frequency with which the noise distribution is sampled, and thereby
centers heterogeneity and ultimately price variability. On the other side, one has a direct eect
due to degree of dis-synchronization: since all agents updating in the same H observe the
same draw, a smaller 
Fu
(bringing closer to synchronicity) reduces centers heterogeneity and
ultimately price variability.
4.3 Experiment 2B
In Experiment 2B, we again take all agents in the room to be fundamentalists ( = 1), but we
assume that agents updating in a given minute observe Z plus iid error draws ( = 1), with
 = 25. Here, even if all agents updated synchronously, one would expect trade to persist, due
to the intrinsic heterogeneity in point-expectations (centers) generated by the separate draws.
We performed simulations in which all agents update synchronously everyM
Fu
transactions
35
,
on the usual grid of values, this time for M
Fu
and s
Fu
36
.
Persistence:
As expected, the system reaches the 50 minutes limit at any level of M
Fu
and s
Fu
. Persistence
is achieved even when agents have the best ex-ante stands.
The path of prices:
Paths are qualitatively similar to those for Experiment 2A: In a rst phase prices undergo a
traverse towards Z, with decreasing volatility. In a second phase they remain about Z, with
a fairly constant volatility. Here though, the traverse can be completely eliminated by fast
updating paces (see below). Fig. 3 shows the path of prices for M
Fu
= 30, s
Fu
= 5 (it can be
compared with Fig. 1 for Experiment 1 and Fig. 2 for Experiment 2A). In contrast, Fig. 4 shows
the path of prices for M
Fu
= 2, s
Fu
= 15; that is, the best ex-ante stand case.
Regarding duration of the traverse, and volatility thereafter, one has
37
:
35
Notice this is not a special case of the Poisson updating scheme we described in Section 2: to reintroduce
synchronization we have to eliminate chance in the updating scheduling.
36
Again, 
No
and s
No
are irrelevant, as they are not used by the simulations relative to Experiment 2B.
37
\none" means (the running calculation of) the average price within minutes is already over Z   at the very
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Fundamentalists (α=1) iid draws (ψ=1) µ=30, s=5 (σ=25)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241 261 281 301 321 341 361 381 401 421 441 461 481
trans. price av. price within minutes (+1) st.dev.
(-1) st.dev. Z Z+s
Z-s st.dev.
N=36 N=50
on average 31.139
(after N=50)
Figure 3: An instance of the path of prices for Experiment 2B
Duration of Traverse: H
trav
Volatility after the Traverse
s
Fu
= 5 s
Fu
= 10 s
Fu
= 15 s
Fu
= 5 s
Fu
= 10 s
Fu
= 15
M
Fu
= 2 none none none M
Fu
= 2 45:874 40:152 36:710
M
Fu
= 10 2 2 2 M
Fu
= 10 37:397 33:012 29:303
M
Fu
= 20 3 3 3 M
Fu
= 20 34:481 29:472 25:765
M
Fu
= 30 4 4 4 M
Fu
= 30 31:139 26:765 23:336
As in Experiment 2A, traverse duration increases as M
Fu
increases (in particular, for M
Fu
= 2
there is no traverse at all), and s
Fu
has no signicant eect.
Again as in Experiment 2A, volatility after the traverse decreases as s
Fu
increases, due to K4.
Unlike Experiment 2A though, the link betweenM
Fu
and volatility is unambiguously an inverse
one. In fact, having imposed synchronicity, one has only the pace of updating eect: a larger
M
Fu
reduces the frequency with which the noise distribution is sampled (iid, by all agents at
the same time). Smaller centers heterogeneity and price variability follow.
When comparing corresponding simulations in Experiments 2A and 2B, one nds that the latter
has shorter traverses and higher volatilities in all cases, except those withM
Fu
(
Fu
) equal to 30.
When the (average or deterministic) sampling frequency is very low, the highly dis-synchronous
single-sampling regime in Experiment 2A diers very little from the synchronous iid-sampling
regime in Experiment 2B.
beginning.
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Fundamentalists (α=1) iid draws (ψ=1) µ=2, s=15 (σ=25)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241 261 281 301 321 341 361 381 401 421 441 461 481
trans. price av. price within minutes (+1) st.dev.
(-1) st.dev. Z Ζ+σ
Ζ−σ st.dev.
N=30
on average 36.710
(after N=30)
Figure 4: Another instance of the path of prices for Experiment 2B
5 Final remarks
The experiments described in this paper served the purpose of test-running FTR and exploring
its exibility in depicting specic contexts as sub-cases. Thus, we did not pursue novel economic
content by addressing scarcely investigated questions or devising sophisticated specications of
our Toy-Room. Rather, we selected a widely investigated issue, and maintained the specication
and the experiment-plan as simple as possible, to be able to \benchmark" and readily check the
consistency of our simulation outcomes.
On the other hand, even this preliminary set-up is rich enough to permit further inquiries.
First, one could perform a second round of experiments in which the room is inhabited by both
fundamentalists and noise traders at the same time: for values of  inside (0; 1), one could
investigate how persistence of trade and the time-path of prices are aected by
 the share of fundamentalists in the room
 the ratio between updating paces of fundamentalists and noise traders
 the ratio between standard deviation guesses of fundamentalists and noise traders.
Relation to the underlying return value and volatility of the path of prices would allow us to
asses their informational content, and hence the ex-post soundness of traders' behaviors, under
dierent parameters settings.
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Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2.5, the set-up could be easily enlarged to encompass non-
spot trading, an entry process, and a non-trivial dynamics for the external return. Those aspects
could all aect persistence and the time-path of prices in a substantial way.
Last, these experiments represent instances of a much broader class of investigations concerning
the analysis of \ecologies" composed by two or more trader-types, in terms of aggregate dynamics
and performance of dierent types
38
.
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